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Judge Harold Greene's decision in Dellums eta/. v. Bush 2 was 
plainly right in its central proposition, that (except in the event of a 
"sudden attack" upon the United States) the Constitution places 
unambiguously in Congress the authority to decide whether the na-
tion goes to war. (Once war is congressionally authorized-note 
that there has never been a requirement that such authorization ac-
tually be labeled a "declaration of war," only that it be clear-au-
thority to manage it then passes to the President in his role as 
"Commander in Chief. ")3 
Judge Greene was right about a second important proposition 
as well: whether the required congressional authorization has been 
obtained is not a "political question" the courts should refuse to 
decide. No one, including the plaintiffs, wants courts to get in-
volved in the business of authorizing wars, only the business of de-
ciding whether Congress has done so. In fact the federal courts 
routinely decided such questions throughout the nineteenth cen-
tury.4 Precious few judges in this century have had the wisdom and 
I. A version of approximately half this essay appeared in the December 23, 1990 issue 
of The Los Angeles Times, and is used here with permission. 
2. 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990). 
3. All this has been demonstrated repeatedly. See sources cited in Ely, Suppose Con-
gress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1379, 1386-92 (1988). 
The problem is not so much a lack of consensus among objective experts respecting the na-
ture of the constitutional command as an unwillingness on the part of the legislative and 
judicial branches to call the executive on its bold (and generally successful) efforts to overrun 
it. 
4. See. e.g., Bas v. Tingey, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (I 
Cranch) I (1801); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 
(2 Black) 635 (1862); Velvet, The War in VietNam: Unconstitutional, Justiciable, and Juris-
dictionally Attackable, 16 U. KAN. L. REv. 449, 480-81 n. 138 (1968) (citing twenty-one 
cases in which federal courts had decided whether Congress had sufficiently authorized mili-
tary action the President was conducting); E. KEYNES, UNDECLARED WAR 94-101 (1982). 
On the application of the political question doctrine to such questions, see generally Ely, 
supra note 3, at 1407-12. 
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courage so forthrightly to endorse either of these propositions, how-
ever. Thus the two cheers for Judge Greene, and loud ones.s 
The lawsuit ran aground, however, on a third finding by Judge 
Greene, that unless and until the plaintiffs (fifty-four members of 
Congress) could get a majority of their colleagues to join their chal-
lenge, the case was not "ripe" for decision. Stuart M. Gerson, the 
Assistant Attorney General who argued the case for the administra-
tion, exulted that the decision had "left the President's prerogatives 
for him to act unchanged and unaffected."6 This is a frightening 
view of the demands of the Constitution for a high Justice Depart-
ment official to take. Judge Greene finds that (although ripeness 
problems preclude judicial injunction) President Bush's (then) uni-
lateral march toward war was an unconstitutional one, and the ad-
ministration claims ... vindication! Gerson's view does have a 
certain practical validity, however, or at least it would for an ad-
ministration set on doing whatever it could get away with. 
Judge Greene appeared to believe that his ripeness holding fol-
lowed directly from the fact that it takes a majority vote in Con-
gress to authorize a war: "the majority of [Congress] under the 
Constitution is the only one competent to declare war, and therefore 
also the one with the ability to seek an order from the courts to 
prevent anyone else, i.e, the Executive, from in effect declaring 
war."1 The only problem is that it isn't a "therefore": in fact alle-
gations that the wrong government official or body has taken the 
action complained of are most commonly brought by someone 
other than the official or body whose authority has been usurped.s 
But maybe Greene just worded it the wrong way around. If it 
takes a majority of Congress to declare a war, it also takes a major-
ity9 to block one. Greene seems to think that, because it would take 
a majority to vote down a presidentially-requested declaration of 
war on the floor of Congress, it should take a similar majority to 
bring suit to block a presidentially-announced decision to go to war 
in court. 
On first reading this version may flow a little more easily, but 
5. Judge Greene was also correct in rejecting the governments' contention that the 
congressional plaintiffs lacked standing. See note 18 infra. 
6. N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1990, at A9, col. 1. 
7. 752 F. Supp. at 1151 (emphasis supplied). 
8. States are rarely plaintiffs in cases challenging congressional action as exceeding 
federal power, the federal government just as rarely a plaintiff in suits to enforce the dormant 
commerce clause. Most separation of powers cases are, similarly, brought by someone other 
than the institution or official whose decision authority was usurped. See. e.g., Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
9. Okay, on some occasions only fifty percent, but we can ignore that refinement with-
out losing the point. 
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on analysis it too proves to be a non sequitur. In the first place, 
Greene's language at several points makes pretty clear that the sort 
of majority he meant to require is a majority of both houses of Con-
gress.w Since it would take only a majority of one house to block a 
declaration of war, however, it would seem to follow, on our recon-
struction of Greene's logic, that such a one-house majority should 
also be able to sue. 
While that confusion may raise questions about the coherence 
of Judge Greene's rationale, it is unlikely often to make a real world 
difference. There are, however, more fundamental respects in 
which Greene's "ripeness" qualms misunderstand the point of the 
Constitution's War Clause, 11 especially as it bears on the political 
structure of late twentieth century America. Most obviously, re-
quiring the president to follow the constitutionally prescribed pro-
cedures--one might suppose that even a single person who will be 
disadvantaged by the war should be able to insist on that-is not the 
same thing as telling him he can't go to war. 
But even assuming it were the same-that everyone who 
wanted to see Congress play its constitutionally mandated role felt 
that way only because she opposed the war on its merits-the fact 
that a majority can block a war by refusing to vote yes still should 
not imply a power on the part of the president to go forward unless 
a majority can organize itself to vote (or sue) no.12 The framers 
were explicit in their understanding that if Congress did not ap-
prove of the executive's pursuance of a given war, it could end it by 
refusing it further funding.I3 But they also understood that once 
the president had committed "our boys" to the battlefield, it would 
become a virtual impossibility, emotionally and politically, to vote 
to cut off their "support." The Constitution requires a congres-
sional declaration of war-it does not say the president can commit 
troops to combat unless Congress takes steps to stop him-and 
there is every indication that this choice was deliberate. 
This original decision has taken on additional validity today. 
10. E.g., 752 F. Supp. at 1151 n.28 (emphasis added): 
Likewise, the non-binding resolution approved by the House Democratic Caucus 
stating that Congress give "affirmative approval" before military action is initiated 
against Iraq ... is not the statement of Congress as a whole. 
See also, e.g., id. at 1152. 
II. Greene's ripeness holding has roots in Justice Powell's (solitary) concurrence in 
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997-1002 (1979). But see Ely, supra note 3, at 1411 n.91; 
note 20 infra and accompanying text. 
12. On the connection between Greene's standing holding and his implicit construction 
of the War Clause as requiring congressional approval on only those occasions when Con-
gress wishes to take a stand one way or the other, see note 19 infra. 
13. See, e.g., A. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 57 
(1976). 
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The late twentieth century is in general an era of comparatively 
unassertive congresses (perhaps one would better say congresses 
comparatively unprepared to put their votes where their misgivings 
are). As a sizeable political science literature has documented, con-
gressmen today have found the most comfortable road to survival-
and do they ever survive-to lie in combining a maximum of indi-
vidual services for constituents, and other interest groups seen as 
critical to reelection, with a minimum of actual legislative policy-
making.'4 
I do not wish to overstate: when the Constitution inescapably 
requires its assent, Congress remains capable of standing up to the 
president, as in the Bork and constitutional flag-burning amend-
ment situations. Decisive legislative action risks constituent sup-
port, though, and thus whenever there is any plausible way to avoid 
decision, Congress tends to take it. The most egregious example of 
this may be the very subject under discussion, war-making. The 
Constitution tried to make that, too, a decision respecting which 
Congress's assent would be inescapably required. The system held 
pretty well for a century and a half but broke down in 1950, over 
Korea--our clearest example of a war not authorized in advance by 
Congress-and it has stayed pretty much broken down ever since. 
Our lengthy, bloody war in Vietnam was, or at least so I have 
argued, sufficiently authorized by Congress, most notably in the 
Tonkin Gulf Resolution, but invariably with a maximum of obfus-
cation, disclaimers that the authorization being enacted certainly 
shouldn't be taken as indicating that those voting for it actually 
wanted the war to proceed.1s And respecting our various smaller 
wars since-Grenada, Tripoli, Panama, the naval war with Iran, 
and so forth-the president's confident assertions that such deci-
sions are his alone, and the majority of Congress's unwillingness to 
take any action stronger than knitting their brows and waiting to 
see how the war in question played politically, both increased apace. 
For wars can go badly or wars can go well, and actually going on 
the record at the beginning (or for that matter any time before the 
end) can be risky. It is far safer to wait for the final curtain to 
decide whether you should applaud, or instead protest that you 
never really approved of the venture. 
The New York Times' editorial of December 16, 1990 summa-
14. See, e.g., M. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE Of THE EXECUTIVE ESTABLISH-
MENT (2d ed. 1989); sources cited in Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and 
Practice in a World Where Courts Are No Different from Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REV. (forth-
coming 1991). 
15. See generally Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part I: The (Troubled) Consti-
tutionality of the War They Told Us About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 877 (1990). 
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rized the administration's overall argument thus: "Congress knows 
how to say no, officials argue, and if it fails to do so, why that's 
tantamount to a declaration of war."I6 We have seen, however, 
that this never was, and today it assuredly is not, a symmetrical 
situation. The fact that a majority of Congress can take action to 
stop a war if it can organize itself to do so is not remotely a func-
tional substitute for the constitutional requirement that wars are not 
to be begun without Congress's affirmative approval. 
Actually the framers didn't want it to be symmetrical-but the 
asymmetry they sought was the exact opposite of that created by 
the combination of the administration's assertions that it doesn't 
need authorization, and Judge Greene's decision. George Mason 
said he was "for clogging rather than facilitating war; but for facili-
tating peace," and Oliver Ellsworth defended the requirement of 
congressional authorization by saying that "[i]t should be more easy 
to get out of war, than into it."I7 Unfortunately Greene's "ripe-
ness" ruling-that it should take one or another sort of "declaration 
of peace," some affirmative action by a majority of Congress to keep 
the country out of war (indeed, to insist that the president follow 
the prescribed procedures)--puts the shoe on the other foot. 
Thus Congressman Dellums and his fifty-three fellow plaintiffs 
did not purport to be speaking for a majority of Congress. While 
President Bush was the nominal, and certainly a proper, defendant, 
he was only part of the story. The suit was aimed in reality not 
simply at the executive branch but at the "silent majority" (well, 
maybe not exactly silent) of the plaintiffs' colleagues as well, the 
majority who were proving most reluctant actually to cast a vote on 
the question whether, and subject to what limitations, the invasion 
should proceed. Though professional courtesy precluded its being 
put just this way, it was a suit that said "[t]he President's unilateral 
actions, and the unwillingness of a majority of our congressional 
colleagues to be forced on the record one way or the other, is de-
priving the fifty-four of us of a right the Constitution guarantees us, 
that of voting on wars before the President starts them."Is It makes 
no sense in a suit thus conceived for the judge to say he'll listen as 
soon as the plaintiffs can get a majority of their colleagues to join 
them.I9 A central point, without which the suit would have been 
16. N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1990, at 14, col. 2. 
17. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTIONS 319 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) 
[hereinafter Farrand). 
18. It is the deprivation of this constitutionally required vote that gives members of 
Congress standing to bring such a suit. See 752 F. Supp. at 1147; Ely, supra note 3, at 1412-
13. 
19. Greene's language at several points underscored the connection between his stand-
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unnecessary,2o was that the very majority the judge wished to see 
thus signed up was striving mightily to avoid having to take a stand 
on the issue one way or the other. 
Why should we care-more to the point why should courts 
care-if Congress wants thus to surrender its constitutional prerog-
atives to the president? Doesn't it have ample means to get them 
back if it ever gets around to wanting to (or at least to make life 
miserable for any president who resists)? Probably it does, but the 
problem with the argument is that the war power wasn't given to 
Congress as a sort of "perk," but rather to insure that no single 
person would be vested with the tragic decision to take the country 
into combat. George Mason said he was "against giving the power 
of war to the Executive, because not safely to be trusted with it."21 
The prerogatives of congressmen aren't what's at stake here, but 
rather the lives of American (and other) young people-mainly, in 
this enlightened age of "volunteer" armies, the lives of young people 
whose disadvantage quota has already been filled. 
EPILOGUE: JANUARY 13, 1991 
As you are aware, since that was written Congress did pass a 
resolution approving President Bush's use of force against Iraq.22 
Can we conclude that the problem is therefore solved-that from 
here on we can count on Congress to step up and take responsibility 
ing holding and his failure to understand that the point of the War Clause cannot be served 
by leaving it up to Congress whether or not it wishes to take a stand. 
[H]ere the [military] forces involved are of such magnitude and significance as to 
present no serious claim that a war would not ensue if they became engaged in 
combat, and it is therefore clear that congressional approval is required if Congress 
desires to become involved. 
752 F. Supp. at 1145 (emphasis supplied). 
What if the Court issued the injunction requested by the plaintiffs, but it subse· 
quently turned out ... that the majority of the members of [the Legislative] Branch, 
for whatever reason, are content to leave this diplomatically and politically delicate 
decision to the President? 
It would hardly do to have the Court, in effect, force a choice upon the Congress 
/d. at 1150-51 (footnote omitted and emphasis supplied). However, since 1950 Congress has 
made it unfortunately clear that it is unprepared to perform its constitutionally assigned func-
tion of deciding on war and peace unless someone forces it to. 
20. Judge Greene's test comes close to making cases like this practically nonjusticiable, 
in that if a majority could be found to sue, presumably-at least on Greene's apparent as-
sumptions (see discussion preceding note 12)--that same majority would enact a resolution to 
forestall or limit the war. 
21. Farrand, supra note 17, at 319. 
22. What's more, the debates preceding the votes in both Houses were among the most 
responsible within my memory-as, indeed, was President Bush's statement reacting to them. 
(It may also be worth noting that whereas the Senate vote in favor of the Tonkin Gulf Reso-
lution was 88-2, the vote here was 52-47.) Congress has by no means lost the ability to decide 
responsibility (if not always as I would); it just needs to be pushed to decide at all. 
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for these decisions? It would be nice to think so-nice, but unduly 
optimistic. Kuwait was obviously unique in several respects. By 
the time of the resolution we had massed over 400,000 troops in the 
area, together with concomitant numbers of ships, planes, and 
tanks: there was no denying that this was going to be a real war, 
and a big one at that. In addition, so many months had passed that 
every Tom, Dick, and Harriet-regular columnists, guest colum-
nists, "friends of the court" -had rehashed every angle of the pro-
posed war so often that the correct constitutional conclusion had 
actually had a chance to become embedded in the public and con-
gressional consciousness: there being no colorable claim that there 
had not been time for debate, this was inescapably Congress's call. 
Neither is Judge Greene likely to recur; his clear and courageous 
stand on the merits of Dellums v. Greene must itself have helped 
Congress understand it really couldn't hide any longer. 
Even all that probably wouldn't have been enough to move 
Congress to act, though. Recall how they had reacted to President 
Bush's earlier bald-faced assertion that the War Powers Resolution 
was inapplicable because there was no "imminent danger of hostili-
ties"-by going home-and up until the very end the "too early/too 
late" whipsaw bid fair to carry the day. ("It's premature to talk of 
war, we must give the diplomatic process a chance" I "The Presi-
dent has been on this course for months, we can't pull the rug out 
from under him now.") What turned it around, of course, was 
President Bush's request that Congress vote an authorization. By 
that request--obviously calculated further to tighten the screws on 
Saddam Hussein-the President deprived Congress of the option it 
has in other cases been able to retain, that of waiting to see whether 
the war goes sour and, if it does, protesting that it was, after all, the 
President's war all along, that they were never even consulted about 
it, let alone asked whether they wished to authorize it. 
I pray I am wrong about this, and the heady smell of accounta-
bility will prove so sweet for the members of Congress that they will 
be moved to reclaim their constitutional prerogatives even when 
they are not essentially forced to. But for the moment I'm afraid 
that all the Kuwait resolution corroborates for me is the feeling that 
Congress can be induced to share the responsibility for politically 
risky decisions only when one of the system's father figures shames 
them into it. It is because there is little hope that the circumstances 
will more than occasionally conspire to induce the president to play 
this role,23 that it seems to me essential that the courts stand ready 
23. There are patent political advantages to the president in spreading the responsibility 
for wars. While one might hope that that by itself would induce presidents to comply with 
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to do so. 
PARTING SHOT: MARCH 22, 1991 
The fact that the war against Iraq went so "well" (at least in 
tenns of relative body counts) probably means that Congress (espe-
cially its Democratic members) will stampede to approve the next 
war that comes along-at least rhetorically, and officially as well if 
the President requests a vote (which for the reasons noted he proba-
bly won't). Assuming our next war doesn't also turn out to be a 
video game-as only the most carefully chosen wars will-Congress 
will probably revert to its familiar pattern of refusing to get any-
where near such issues unless someone forces it to. Although, once 
pushed, Congress performed its duty quite responsibly this time, the 
moral it is likely to draw from the story is that it should either 
(a) rubber-stamp or (b) hide, not that it should in the future, at least 
not voluntarily, actually assume responsibility for such frightening 
decisions. 
John Hart Ely* 
the Constitution, the fact is it hasn't. The advantages of such accountability-spreading have 
been evident for some time, but just as evidently they have seemed to a series of presidents 
insufficiently attractive in the ordinary case (one lacking Kuwait's months_-long attempt at 
intimidation by increasing threat) to outweigh the reduction in effective umlateral prestden-
tial power thought to be entailed by an admission that the decision is not by rights his al~ne. 
• Robert E. Paradise Professor of Law and Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institu-
tion on War, Revolution & Peace, Stanford University. 
